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RESEARCH ARTICLE
Co-opting the state: how weak parties can make
stable party systems
Albertus Schoeman
School of Law, Politics and Sociology, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK
ABSTRACT
Conventional understandings of party system institutionalisation assume that
institutionalised parties are necessary for interparty competition to stabilise.
However, this approach neglects the role of the state in shaping party
competition. Using survey data from Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, it is
shown that weakly institutionalised parties can lead to institutionalised party
systems if parties are able to successfully co-opt the state and use state
resources to supplement party deficiencies. By developing a relationship that
intertwines parties with the state, parties in young democracies do not need
to institutionalise for stable party systems to form.
KEYWORDS Party institutionalisation; party system institutionalisation; clientelism; patronage; South
Asia; party politics
Introduction
Conventional understandings of party system institutionalisation (PSI)
assume that party systems will be stable if political parties are well-institutio-
nalised. For Hicken and Kuhonta (2014, pp. 3–4), PSI is directly related to insti-
tutionalised parties, claiming that ‘the stability of interparty competition must
necessarily depend on the presence of cohesive and ideological organiz-
ations’. Mainwaring and Torcal (2006) similarly claim that stability in inter-
party competition is primarily achieved through the development of
parties’ programmatic linkages to society.
The common assumption is that party systems become stable through the
development of ideological or programmatic linkages built around the polar-
isation of a societal cleavage. In turn, to build these programmatic linkages,
formal party organisations are required to shape cleavages and infuse
values in society. Based on this causal chain, PSI is dependent on parties
being well-organised and strongly rooted in society through ideological
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affiliation. These two concepts, party organisation and societal rootedness,
are at the core of party institutionalisation and many conceptualisations of
PSI assume them to be the underlying cause of stability.
Using South Asia as a case study, this article challenges this conventional
understanding that PSI is dependent on the institutionalisation of individual
parties. Rather, it is argued that party systems can assume relatively stable
and predictable patterns of inter-party competition if parties are capable of
developing a relationship with the state which can provide the resources
necessary to sustain themselves. In this way party systems can become
stable without parties developing well-institutionalised organisations. In
South Asia, it is argued that three systems can be seen: an institutionalised
party system born out of parties’ intimate relationship with the state (Bangla-
desh), an institutionalised party system made up of institutionalised parties
(India), and a more fluid party system where parties are only moderately insti-
tutionalised and have been incapable of co-opting the state (Pakistan).
In the first section, the dominant paradigm surrounding PSI is discussed
and critiqued. Thereafter, an alternate set of hypotheses examining parties’
relationship to the state is presented. This is followed by an elaboration of
the case selection, data and methods used. Finally, the results are summar-
ised in four parts (party organisation, linkages, clientelism, and party patron-
age), which is followed by a discussion of the results and a conclusion.
Reviewing the literature
An institutionalised party system is
one in which actors develop expectations and behavior based on the premise
that the fundamental contours and rules of party competition and behavior will
prevail into the foreseeable future. In an institutionalized party system, there is
stability in who the main parties are and how they behave. (Mainwaring &
Torcal, 2006, p. 206)
This is the most commonly accepted definition of the concept with most
scholars agreeing on stability as a core feature of PSI (Casal Bértoa, 2018, p.
66). Particularly, there is an expectation that there should be stability in
who the main actors are in a party system. Systems lacking institutionalisation
are those that experience the frequent entry and exit of new parties with
recurrent changes in the choices available to voters. In such systems, voters
face significant challenges in identifying the party which most closely
aligns with their interests and lack many of the heuristics that would ordina-
rily be used to cast their vote.
Mainwaring and Scully’s (1995, pp. 4–5) seminal work which revived inter-
est in PSI identified four dimensions to the concept: stability in interparty
competition, the stability of parties’ linkages with society, the legitimacy of
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parties and elections, and party organisations with reasonably stable rules
and structures. However, this four-dimensional conceptualisation has been
critiqued for its failure to disentangle several related, but distinction phenom-
ena. This is partly related to the conceptual nesting of party institutionalisa-
tion as a component element of PSI. Two of the four characteristics of
institutionalised party systems identified (party rootedness and party organ-
isation) are directly related to the institutionalisation of individual parties as
opposed to the system of interaction.
The perception is that, as individual parties constitute the party system,
the institutionalisation of the distinct components as well as the institutiona-
lisation of patterned interaction among them contribute to the overall insti-
tutionalisation of the system (Meleshevich, 2007, p. 16). Indeed, many
scholars still treat the institutionalisation of parties and party systems as inter-
changeable and synonymous concepts (Casal Bértoa, 2017, p. 404). However,
as Randall and Svåsand (2002, pp. 8–9) point out party systems can be
unevenly institutionalised across parties and particularly in newer democra-
cies, some parties may be significantly more institutionalised than others.
Further, based on Sartori’s definition of a party system, systems constitute
something more than individual parties as ‘the system displays properties
that do not belong to a separate consideration of its component elements’
(Sartori, 1976, p. 43). It is therefore misleading to assume that institutionalised
parties will necessarily mean that the party system is institutionalised.
Further, it is possible for the two concepts to diverge. Parties can be institu-
tionalised while the systemwithin which they function is not. Similarly, it is poss-
ible for party systems to be stable (i.e. institutionalised) while parties are not. As
Luna (2014, p. 413) argues, party systems can be characterised by ‘contradictory
configurations’ where inter-party competition is stable, but parties are weakly
rooted in society. Likewise, interparty competition can be stable even where
parties exhibit a lack of formal party organisation (Hellmann, 2014, p. 54).
Later work by Mainwaring addressed some of this by revising his concep-
tualisation of PSI to focus exclusively on stability in interparty competition as
the core of PSI with the justification that it ‘does not intrinsically require the
other three previous dimensions’ (Mainwaring, 2018, p. 4). This reconceptua-
lization removes factors relating to party institutionalisation (party rooted-
ness and organisation) as components of PSI and makes a better
distinction between the two. However, the underlying causal assumptions
remain with the acknowledgement that these ‘dimensions are underpinnings
that facilitate PSI’ (Mainwaring 2018, p. 4). Although PSI has been concep-
tually narrowed to focus primarily on stability in inter-party competition,
the assumption remains that the primary way for a party system to
become institutionalised is through institutionalised parties.
While conceptually related, party and party system institutionalisation do
not necessarily have to converge. However, as Mainwaring (2018) claim,
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programmatic linkages and well-developed party organisations have a clear
role in facilitating PSI. How then, without these dimensions structuring
party competition, is it possible for party systems to stabilise into a predict-
able pattern of inter-party competition with the same parties at the core of
the party system? Alternatively, how can stable party systems form in lieu
of institutionalised parties?
How weakly institutionalised parties can draw on the state to
compete
The role of the state in structuring party competition is a significant factor
unacknowledged by the literature on the causes of PSI. Often, parties are con-
ceptualised as actors distinct from the state, functioning as a bridge between
the state and society. However, this neat separation is not always true in prac-
tice and particularly in the case of new democracies, parties often originate
within the state (van Biezen & Kopecký, 2007, p. 237). This historical origin
is significant as it often defines future party development as the political
culture and institutions formed during a historical turning point tend to
persist long past their immediate creation (LaPalombara & Weiner, 1966, p.
14). Consequently, the way in which parties relate to the state at significant
historical junctures have a major influence on the trajectory of future party-
state relations and the development of both.
This is particularly true for countries with a history of authoritarian rule. In
such cases, the history of civil–military relations and ties to the past define the
context within which political parties develop. In such systems, parties with
ties to the previous regime often survive, and at times thrive, under new
systems of electoral competition. Such authoritarian successor parties,
parties that emerge from authoritarian regimes but operate after the tran-
sition to democracy, often receive significant benefit from their ties to the
previous regime (Loxton, 2018). In this way, civil–military relations in the
aftermath of authoritarian rule can define how parties relate to the state
and shape the environment in which party systems form. This can be seen
in the cases of Bangladesh and Pakistan, where the civil–military relationship
at the return of multi-party elections had a defining effect on the develop-
ment of the respective parties and party systems. In Pakistan, the military’s
economic and political dominance over the state has continued and has
been used to undermine the development of the political parties (Siddiqa,
2011, p. 153). In Bangladesh, the authoritarian origins of both the Bangladesh
Awami League (BAL) and Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) have defined
parties’ relationship to the state and their dominance over it (Suykens, 2017).
There are many advantages or ‘authoritarian inheritances’ that such parties
can benefit from including a strong party brand, a record of effective govern-
ance or a well-developed party organisation. Perhaps the most important
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advantage that such parties can draw on is the relationship developed with
state institutions, which can provide significant support for such parties.
Additionally, patronage networks built during authoritarian rule can provide
a basis fromwhich tomobilise support. In newdemocracies, this close relation-
ship with the state can prove a significant benefit for parties lacking societal
roots or a well-developed party organisation. Further, this relationship can
provide parties with the opportunity to build the organisation through party
patronage and enrich supporters who in turn fund the party.
There are many ways in which parties can use the state to their electoral
advantage. More authoritarian means could include harassing political
opponents, manipulating the electoral rules, or suppressing voters through
a variety of ways. Less coercive methods commonly used are clientelism
and party patronage, which form the focus of this paper. These methods
are employed in both democracies and electorally competitive authoritarian
regimes and it is argued that through the use of state resources to support
parties, party systems in several countries have assumed a stable format
despite the relative weakness of parties. In these cases, parties have
focused on strategies for finding ways to intertwine themselves with the
state rather than developing the party organisation and building societal lin-
kages – as is the commonly assumed path for electoral success. Through
using an informal relationship with the state, parties in such systems can
leverage this relationship to supplement their deficiencies.
Katz and Mair’s (1995, p. 17) cartelisation thesis first introduced the idea of
the ‘interpenetration of party and state’ as the latest stage in the develop-
ment of European political parties. In this final stage of party evolution,
cartel parties are characterised by the professionalisation of politics and the
decline in party membership as they become intertwined with the state.
These parties act as ‘semi-state agencies’ relying on state resources to main-
tain the parties and informally collude by distributing patronage among the
main parties to fend off challengers (Katz & Mair, 1995, p. 16). An important
distinction to make, however, is that Katz and Mair’s cartelisation thesis is
directed at well-organised, established parties in advanced democracies. In
many emerging democracies, it is not that parties evolve and merge into
the state, but rather that they emerge from the state, or build the party organ-
isation out of their privileged access to state resources.
Parties can use their relationship with the state to supplement weakly insti-
tutionalised parties in two main ways: clientelism to supplement weak
societal linkages, and party patronage to build the party organisation. Clien-
telism occurs when parties offer ‘material benefits only on the condition that
the recipient returns the favour with a vote or other forms of political support’
(Stokes et al., 2013, p. 13). This is a commonly used practice in many democ-
racies to target voters and is one of the primary ways in which parties use the
state to support the party through the distribution of public goods to tie
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voters to the party. This can be particularly problematic in emerging econom-
ies where the state is often one of the largest employers in the country and
controls a significant share of the overall economy. In such cases, parties with
few resources have an incentive to act as gatekeepers and a favourable
relationship with parties will have significant appeal for elites and voters alike.
While clientelism is primarily directed at gaining electoral support for the
party, parties must also build a party organisation to effectively govern. One
of the means of achieving this is party patronage which ties political elites to
the party. Party patronage is a form of party-state linkage whereby parties use
their relationship with the state as an organisational resource to build and
maintain the party organisation by tying political elites to the party
through offers of jobs and power in government (Kopecký & Mair, 2012,
pp. 7–8). Understood in this way, patronage is not concerned with vote-gath-
ering, but rather with building the party’s organisational network. Through
their power to appoint individuals to state institutions and distribute state
jobs, parties can tie activists and political elites to the party to build the
party organisation and its networks. This is both necessary to effectively
control the state and to contain challengers. By keeping ambitious elites in
the party fold with patronage, parties can prevent the emergence of challen-
gers and thereby consolidate their hold on power. Further, by leveraging
their relationship with the state, parties can thus build two types of
support necessary for electoral success – that of political elites and of the
electorate. If parties are capable of effectively leveraging their relationship
with the state to supplement party deficiencies, it is not necessary for them
to build the party organisation and its linkages in the way that is commonly
assumed necessary for institutionalised party systems. Based on the literature
and discussion above, it is hypothesised that:
H1: Institutionalised parties with strong linkages and a well-developed party
organisation are a sufficient condition for an institutionalised party system.
H2: Parties lacking significant institutionalisation, but which have co-opted the
state to supplement party deficiencies are a sufficient condition for an institu-
tionalised party system.
H3: Parties lacking significant institutionalisation, and which are incapable of
co-opting the state, will be unable to form an institutionalised party system.
Case selection
Aside from India, PSI has not received significant scholarly attention in studies
of South Asia. Yet, the region is intriguing as it challenges conventional
understandings of the causes of party system stability and change based
on the dynamics discussed above. Conventional explanations for understand-
ing systems usually emphasise ideological cleavages and the effects of
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electoral systems (Chhibber & Kollman, 2004, pp. 14–15). However, with the
possible exception of India, ideological cleavages in South Asia remain
superficial and parties are more pragmatic than ideological. Further, Bangla-
desh, India and Pakistan all employ similar first-past-the-post systems allow-
ing for this factor to be controlled. Instead, the defining feature explaining
variation lies with how parties relate to the state and the extent of their
institutionalisation.
Despite the relative lack of party institutionalisation, there has been a sem-
blance of continuity in who the main parties of Bangladesh, India and Paki-
stan are since the 1990s. This was an important turning point in South
Asian politics and largely defines contemporary party systems. This period
saw the return of multiparty elections to Pakistan in 1988 and Bangladesh
in 1991. In India, this was also a significant juncture in its party system with
the 1991 election seen as the start of a new phase ending Congress’ predo-
minance over a fractured opposition and the formation of a new cleavage
around the ‘three Ms of Indian politics’ – Mandal, Mandir and Market
(Yadav, 1999, p. 2394). This is not to say that these party systems have
been perfectly stable during this time. Changes have occurred, but at the
core, there has been continuity in who the main players are that structure
party competition.
Since 1991, the Bangladeshi party system has been dominated by the BAL
and the BNP (Amundsen, 2016, p. 52). In Pakistan, until the 2018 election
which brought Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) to power, politics largely
centred around the parties of the Sharif and Bhutto dynasties since the multi-
party elections of 1988. The Indian party system has a wider range of compe-
titors and has seen important changes at the regional level, but at the core,
the two main national parties around which the party system is structured
have remained the Indian National Congress (INC) and the Bharatiya Janata
Party (BJP) although their coalition allies have often changed. The approxi-
mate relationship between party and party system institutionalisation for
the three countries since the early 1990s is illustrated below (Figure 1).
India’s party system since the 1990s in some ways represents the tra-
ditional path towards an institutionalised party system. At the regional
level, and in terms of coalition partners, the Indian party system remains
more complex, but at the core, the party system has stabilised around a
binodal configuration of competition between the two major alliances led
by the INC and BJP (Schakel et al., 2019, p. 330). Competition between the
INC and BJP forms the focus of the Indian component of this study as it
largely defines competition for government formation at the national level.
For a more nuanced discussion on the role of India’s federal system and
regional parties see Ziegfeld (2016). The INC has a long history and strong
party brand which has firmly rooted the party in society. While showing an
element of personalisation in the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty, the party is still
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organisationally complex. Likewise, the BJP has grown into a vastly complex
organisation with extensive links across society. Its electoral success in recent
years can be attributed to the strength of the party organisation and its
effective mobilisation of voters and party activists through its strong ideologi-
cal appeal.
In Bangladesh and Pakistan, the same parties have persisted as key players
despite the presence of highly personalised parties with relatively poor levels
of organisation. Particularly in Bangladesh, the main parties have not
changed significantly since 1991 (Blair 2010) and until the emergence of
the PTI, the main competitors had largely stayed the same in Pakistan
(Rollier, 2020, p. 121). This defies the commonly held assumption that party
systems stabilise through the institutionalisation of parties which embed
themselves in the political system by developing programmatic linkages to
society through political activism carried out by the party organisation.
With neither significant programmatic linkages nor well-developed party
organisations, how is it that these parties have persisted? The answer may
lie with their relationship to the state.
Although Bangladesh and Pakistan are somewhat imperfect democracies,
studying PSI in semi-democratic systems is not without precedent. As Hicken
and Kuhonta (2014, p. 5) argue, a significant number of institutionalised
systems have historical roots in semi-democratic regimes and institutiona-
lised party systems may or may not be consolidated democracies. Indeed,
they argue that semi-democratic conditions may be a contributing factor
Figure 1. Party system development since early 1990s.
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to the institutionalisation of party systems in East Asia. While it may be con-
tested as to what extent elections in Bangladesh and Pakistan are completely
free and fair, scholars increasingly concede that democracy should be under-
stood on a spectrum rather than a dichotomy. With features of both demo-
cratic and authoritarian institutions, Bangladesh (Riaz, 2019) and Pakistan
(Adeney, 2017) can be classified as hybrid regimes.
Data & method
Data was collected using expert surveys based on a framework of questions
from the Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project (Kitschelt, 2013)
and the Political Parties Database (Poguntke et al., 2018). While there are
limitations to using experts, such as the problem of respondents’ biases,
these limitations can be offset by using a multiple-rater design and aggregat-
ing responses to minimise error as employed in this study (Maestas, 2018,
p. 586). Experts were selected based on their knowledge of political parties
in one of the three countries included in the study. A total of 37 valid
responses was anonymously collected from academics and civil society
organisations researching parties. These questions relate to four clusters of
topics: the party organisation, the strength of parties’ linkages, the extent
and targets of clientelism, and the extent to which party patronage is preva-
lent in each country. These clusters of indicators either relate to party institu-
tionalisation (party organisation and strength of linkages) or to party
behaviour which uses access to state resources (clientelism and party patron-
age) to supplement deficiencies in party institutionalisation.
To understand the extent to which party organisations are valued as insti-
tutions distinct from individual actors three measures are examined. The first
indicator examines the diffusion of power in candidate selection and is used
to determine whether candidates are selected by a small group of powerful
leaders or through a more complex mechanism that considers branches of
the party. Two further measures consider the expansiveness of the organis-
ations by examining the extent to which permanent party offices are main-
tained throughout the country, and the extent to which parties maintain
an informal presence in the community. To determine the strength of party
linkages, respondents were asked to evaluate the strength of parties’ relation-
ship with six types of civil society organisations on a scale of 0 (no linkages) to
4 (very strong linkages).
To understand clientelism, respondents were asked two sets of questions:
whether parties engage in clientelist practices towards each of the six types
of interest groups, and the extent to which parties engage in four types of
clientelist practices that rely on access to state resources. The interest
groups and forms of clientelism are listed in Tables 1 and 2. Finally, to deter-
mine the extent to which party patronage is prevalent in each country,
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respondents were asked to evaluate the extent to which appointments in
nine different state sectors are made on the basis of rewarding party
loyalty rather than merit.
Results
The two main themes in the literature on party institutionalisation centre on
party organisation and the strength of party linkages (Casal Bértoa, 2017,
p. 408). For a party organisation to be institutionalised, it needs to have
value and lasting power beyond individual leaders. Parties lacking formal
organisation are those which act on an ad hoc basis and are often based
in personalism with a leader-centric organisational structure. In such
parties, ‘activists often find their career advancement prospects blocked
by arbitrary decision-making, nepotistic practices or the whims of a few
leaders at the top’ (Chhibber et al., 2014, p. 492). Established rules and
norms govern an institutionalised party and these processes should be rou-
tinised to guide decision-making and constrain individual leaders. Similarly,
complexity in the organisation beyond individual figures shows the extent
to which a party functions as an institution guided by rules and norms
rather than individual leaders.
Table 1. Averaged responses on the strength of parties’ linkages to different sectors of
civil society. Responses range from a scale of 0 (not at all) to 4 (to a great extent).
Bangladesh India Pakistan
BAL BNP INC BJP PML (N) PPP PTI
Unions 3.11 2.11 1.79 2.56 0.86 2.29 1
Business 3.33 2.89 2.14 3.19 3.43 1.71 2.43
Religious organisations 2.89 3.22 1.15 3.69 2.88 1.25 2.38
Ethnic, linguistic or caste-based
organisations
2.67 1.78 2.53 2.41 2 2.88 1.63
Urban/Rural organisations 2.5 1.88 1.85 2.5 2.5 3.13 2.38
Women’s organisations 3.13 2.5 2 2.53 1.71 2.38 2.13
Average 2.94 2.40 1.91 2.81 2.23 2.27 1.99
Table 2. Averaged responses on the extent to which parties engaged in clientelism
using state resources. Responses range from a scale of 0 (not at all) to 4 (to a great
extent).
Bangladesh India Pakistan
BAL BNP INC BJP PML (N) PPP PTI
Preferential public benefits 3.14 2.67 3.00 2.82 3.38 3.38 3.00
Preferential employment opportunities 3.00 3.20 2.18 2.00 3.25 3.25 2.75
Preferential government contracts 2.86 3.00 2.29 2.35 3.38 3.00 2.63
Preferential regulation 2.80 2.75 2.24 2.41 3.25 3.13 2.75
Average 2.95 2.90 2.43 2.40 3.31 3.19 2.78
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Party organisation
The institutionalisation of a party is limited as long as it is used as the personal
instrument of a leader or a small group of elites. An institutionalised party
should have value in its own right beyond these elite figures. A good way
to determine this is to examine how power and decision-making is spread
in an organisation. A highly centralised party will be more personalistic and
based on the whims of individual leaders, while a party with shared
decision-making structures and bargaining between the various levels of
the party will be guided by processes and values beyond individuals.
One of the important functions of a party is to put forward candidates for
elections and the processes for deciding candidates is one of the ways to
understand how power is distributed. Survey respondents were asked to
evaluate the balance of power within parties when selecting candidates for
national elections (Figures 2–4).
Generally, the parties are regarded as quite centralised. In Pakistan, there
is near unanimous consensus that the balance of power for candidate selec-
tion lies with core leaders for all parties. Similarly, candidate selection in
Bangladesh is regarded by most as centralised in party leaders, with the
BNP seen as slightly more open to bargaining between different levels of
the party. In India, the balance of power in candidate selection is seen as
more decentralised with a near even-split between respondents who see
power lying primarily with party leaders and those who see it as an
outcome of bargaining, or a decision made by regional branches. While
this may be a consequence of India’s size and diversity, this itself shows
the complexity of the two organisations and the value that the party
Figure 2. Which of the following four options best describes the following parties’
balance of power in selecting candidates for national legislative elections? –
Bangladesh.
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brand holds beyond individual leaders, which is consistent with H1 and
what is expected of institutionalised parties.
A second way of measuring the organisational complexity of parties is to
look at the extent to which parties organise throughout the country. The
more extensive a party’s network of offices across the country, the more orga-
nisationally complex it can be considered. Local branch offices can maintain a
presence in the community serving as the local representatives of the party as
well as providing a formal structure with which party activists and supporters
can coordinate. As shown below, respondents were asked to evaluate
Figure 4. Which of the following four options best describes the following parties’
balance of power in selecting candidates for national legislative elections? – Pakistan.
Figure 3. Which of the following four options best describes the following parties’
balance of power in selecting candidates for national legislative elections? – India.
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whether parties maintained permanent offices and paid staff in districts
across the country (Figures 5–7).
All parties, with the exception of the PPP, are regarded by a majority of
respondents to maintain permanent local offices in most districts. An interest-
ing observation is that in each country, the ruling party is seen as the most
territorially expansive. This is likely a testament to the increased resources
available to ruling parties through their access to state resources and these
local offices will play an important role in distributing benefits and maintain-
ing links in the community.
Figure 6. Do the following parties maintain offices and paid staff at the local or munici-
pal level? If yes, are these offices and staff permanent or only during national elections?
– India.
Figure 5. Do the following parties maintain offices and paid staff at the local or munici-
pal level? If yes, are these offices and staff permanent or only during national elections?
– Bangladesh.
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Beyond formal party offices, parties also interact with the community in
more informal ways which often forms part of strategies to build party lin-
kages. This can include social and leisure activities organised by parties to
build linkages with a community. This is a more nuanced approach, but it
reveals a lot about the nature of the linkages that parties have with their sup-
porters (Figures 8–10).
Parties in Bangladesh, although scoring quite high for their formal pres-
ence perform slightly lower for their informal community relationship build-
ing. The BJP is regarded by all respondents as having a strong community
presence and again, this shows the strength of the party organisation. The
INC performs slightly better than their formal presence. The majority of
respondents regard Pakistani parties as having a permanent presence in com-
munities. Interestingly, the PPP which was regarded as the least territorially
expansive in terms of formal offices, scores very highly for their informal com-
munity presence.
These measures consider the routinisation and institutional capacity of the
different parties as organisations. However, the ultimate aim of the party
organisation is to help establish the party and its ideals in society to
gain electoral support. Institutionalised parties should also be firmly rooted
in society.
Strength of linkages
For parties to remain competitive in a party system, it is important that they
are rooted in society with strong linkages which tie voters to the party. Parties
with strong linkages to voters and interest groups have greater lasting power
Figure 7. Do the following parties maintain offices and paid staff at the local or munici-
pal level? If yes, are these offices and staff permanent or only during national elections?
– Pakistan.
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and through their linkages can better represent political interests and main-
tain power. Parties with stronger links, as well as a diversity of links, can be
considered more institutionalised.
This societal rootedness is often built through the development of linkages
with interest groups which support the party and help connect parties to
voters. To determine the strength of parties’ linkages to society, respondents
were asked to evaluate the strength of linkages on a scale of 0 (no linkages) to
4 (very strong linkages) for six categories of interest groups. Respondents
Figure 9. Do the following parties’ local organisations maintain a permanent social and
community presence by holding social events for local party members or sustaining
ancillary social groups such as party youth movements, party cooperatives or athletic
clubs? – India.
Figure 8. Do the following parties’ local organisations maintain a permanent social and
community presence by holding social events for local party members or sustaining
ancillary social groups such as party youth movements, party cooperatives or athletic
clubs? – Bangladesh.
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were asked: ‘do the following parties have strong linkages to one or more of
the following civil society organisations, and how strong are the linkages
between these organisations and the party?’ Responses are summarised
below by averaging responses for each party and each category of interest
group. A score closer to 4 indicates stronger linkages while 0 indicates no lin-
kages. Respondents were asked to evaluate the strength of parties’ linkages
for the country in which they are an expert. Consequently, comparisons
between countries should be made with caution (Table 1).
Both Bangladeshi parties received a relatively high score, but there is a
clear difference between the ruling BAL and the opposition BNP. For every
category other than religious organisations, the BAL was regarded as
having stronger linkages than the BNP – often by a significant margin such
as for trade unions. Interestingly, the BAL has strong linkages with both
unions and business unlike in Pakistan, for instance, where there is a
clearer pro-business or pro-worker distinction.
The difference between the BJP and INC is stark. The BJP received high
scores for several categories, particularly for business and religious organis-
ations – where the result approaches the maximum score of 4. Again, the
ruling BJP curiously shows strong linkages across classes with a broad coalition
of support from both business and unions. Much like Bangladesh, the ruling BJP
is seen as having stronger linkages in nearly every category – apart from ethnic,
linguistic or caste-based organisations where the INC’s linkages are incremen-
tally stronger. Indeed, the INC’s linkages to ethnic, linguistic or caste-based
organisations are considered their strongest among the various categories.
Pakistan proves curious as it is the only case where the ruling party’s lin-
kages are considered weaker than opposition parties. Indeed, this is the
Figure 10. Do the following parties’ local organisations maintain a permanent social
and community presence by holding social events for local party members or sustaining
ancillary social groups such as party youth movements, party cooperatives or athletic
clubs? – Pakistan.
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case for every category and in most categories, the PTI’s linkages are seen as
significantly weaker than either the PML (N) or PPP. This defies conventional
explanations for parties’ electoral success and the explanation could lie with
the popularity of PTI’s leader Imran Khan rather than the strength of the party.
Additionally, unlike India and Bangladesh where there is a clear variation
between the ruling party and opposition, the difference between the
overall strength of parties’ linkages in Pakistan is marginal. There is,
however, variation within each category. Particularly between the PML (N)
and PPP there is clear variation in the origins of their support. The pro-
business PML (N) also receives support from religious organisations, while
the secular PPP is known for its land reform policies and enjoys the
support of rural organisations and unions. In turn, the PTI’s support is scat-
tered with no particularly strong linkages in any category distinguishing
the party.
The strength of parties’ linkages, however, cannot be fully understood
without considering the nature of the linkages. Voters associate with
parties for various reasons including ideological affinity, traditional ties
such as by being co-ethnics, or through clientelist inducements. Clientelism
as a tactic has been used in many young democracies to build linkages
between parties and voters. Particularly in cases where parties are ideologi-
cally thin or lack deep roots in society, clientelism may be an appealing
tactic for supplementing weak linkages.
Clientelism
Clientelism does not necessarily have to rely on the redirection of state
resources, but it often does. Parties with access to state resources can offer
a range of inducements to elicit the support of voters. This can include the
provision of public benefits such as housing or public goods to only party
supporters, or the offer of employment in the public sector to individuals
or their family. Another tactic is to target voters indirectly by offering govern-
ment contracts such as public works projects or preferential regulation to
businesses in exchange for the support of their employees. In this way,
parties can tie the economic wellbeing of their supporters to the electoral
success of the party. In developing economies where the state is heavily
involved in the economy, aligning with the party in power can have signifi-
cant benefits.
The extent to which parties engage in clientelism can help contextualise
parties’ linkages. Parties heavily engaged in clientelism likely draw much of
their strength from these clientelist linkages. To show this, respondents
were asked questions about whether parties offer voters preferential access
to various services provided by the state as an inducement to obtain votes.
Respondents were also asked to identify the types of voters targeted with
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these inducements. Engaging in clientelistic practices towards a specific
group has a positive effect on the strength of linkages and is statistically sig-
nificant for linkages with religious organisations (X2= 19.167, df. = 4, p = .001),
ethnic, linguistic or caste-based organisations (X2 = 12.390, df. = 4, p = .014)
and women’s organisations (X2 = 17.061, df. 4, p = .002).
Respondents were also asked to evaluate the extent to which parties give
or promise to give supporters preferential treatment or access to public
goods in four areas controlled by the state as an inducement to obtain
votes. These four areas focus on preferential access to public benefits,
employment opportunities, government contracts, and government regu-
lation. Responses were recorded on a scale of 0 (no effort at all) to 4 (a
major effort). Responses have been averaged with the assumption that the
scale can be regarded as continuous (Table 2).
Intriguingly, in both Bangladesh and India, the two main parties are
regarded as about equally clientelist. However, for the BNP and INC this
clearly has not translated into the strong linkages of the ruling BAL and
BJP. There are two possible explanations for this. First, to successfully
entice voters and maintain clientelist networks, a party would need access
to state resources to deliver the promised inducements. In this sense, incum-
bent parties with control over state resources have an advantage over oppo-
sition parties as these resources can be used to build linkages.
The alternative explanation lies with the party organisation and the
strength of clientelist networks. Clientelism is usually only effective if parties
have mechanisms in place for determining whether voters targeted by cliente-
lism have indeed turned out to support the party (Kitschelt & Singer, 2018, p.
56). This requires an organisational network of local brokers tomonitor turnout
and mobilise clients. Converting clientelism to stronger linkages thus requires
some organisational complexity and strength. It should be recalled that in the
section of party organisations, the BAL and BJP were also seen as the most ter-
ritorially expansive parties with the vast majority of respondents stating that
these parties maintain permanent party offices in most districts.
Again, Pakistan proves a curious case with both opposition parties seen as
more clientelist than the ruling PTI. However, it should be recalled that Paki-
stan’s parties were relatively similar in terms of the overall strength of their
linkages. Despite highly clientelist behaviour, Pakistan’s parties seem
unable to convert this into strong linkages. There are two possible expla-
nations for this. First, for clientelism to be effective as previously mentioned,
a certain level of party organisation is necessary to successfully convert clien-
telism into lasting linkages. As seen in the section on party organisation, Paki-
stan’s parties are regarded as comparatively less territorially expansive than
the parties of India and Bangladesh. The difference in formal organisation
is, however, incremental and Pakistan’s parties make up for this with stronger
informal ties to the community.
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A more plausible explanation is that Pakistan’s parties are insufficiently
intertwined with the state to successfully tie voters to the party through clien-
telism. Without significant discretion over the allocation of state resources, a
party’s ability to build linkages through clientelism will be more limited. Con-
versely, parties well-intertwined with their state will be more capable of lever-
aging their access to state resources to build linkages through clientelism.
Party patronage
In countries where party patronage is high, parties are more clearly inter-
twined with the state. In such cases, party members take up roles in state
institutions, giving them discretionary power over policymaking and the allo-
cation of resources. Party patronage both ties political activists to the party
through rewarding them with state sector jobs and supports the party’s
ability to engage in clientelist practices. The ability to pack state institutions
with party members thus both gives parties greater control over these insti-
tutions and is an opportunity to build networks of dependents interested in
maintaining the party’s continued rule. Respondents were asked to evaluate
the extent to which the practice of making public sector appointments on the
basis of rewarding party activists is prevalent in each country (Table 3).
As an indicator of the extent to which parties are intertwined with the state,
party patronage provides an important context for themeasures discussed pre-
viously. In Bangladesh, state institutions are seen as highly politicised with
several sectors approaching the maximum of 4. Several important sectors
such as the judiciary, military and police, as well as regional and local adminis-
tration receive extremely high scores. As both highly clientelist and extensively
intertwined with the state, the strength of the ruling BAL’s linkages take on a
new meaning. This aligns with H2 which states that parties capable of co-
opting the state will be able to supplement their deficiencies and consequently,
allow for the formation of an institutionalised party system. Through clientelism
andparty patronage, Bangladesh’s parties haveusedgovernmentpower to shift
economic benefit primarily to their supporters, excluding opponents and creat-
ing dependencies among supporters (Suykens, 2017, p. 207). Consequently,
through parties’ co-optation of the state, the party system has stabilised.
India by comparison, shows far more professionalisation of state insti-
tutions. Only a small amount of appointments in state institutions are done
on a political basis and some of the most important sectors such as the judi-
ciary, military and police, and foreign service all receive low scores. The lack of
party patronage is a good indication of the independence of India’s state
institutions and the separation of parties and the state. India’s parties are con-
sequently less dependent on the state and as they are also less clientelist, it
can be assumed that the nature of their linkages come from a more genuine
affiliation with the parties. Particularly in the case of the BJP, it is clear that the
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party is organisationally complex and has strong linkages independent of its
ability to provide access to state resources. This aligns with H1, which states
that the presence of institutionalised parties will be a sufficient condition for
the formation of an institutionalised party system.
This does not, however, mean that parties do not use their access to state
resources for their own benefit. One sector receiving a comparatively high
score is regional and local administration. This is a sector likely used to
reward rank-and-file party members with employment. So, while this data
shows that parties cannot or do not rely on party patronage to wholly main-
tain the party organisation, parties do to some extent make use of state
employment to reward followers. This should also be nuanced with the
acknowledgement of India’s regional parties which are known to rely on cli-
entelism (Ziegfeld, 2016).
Pakistan shows a low to moderate amount of party patronage. The highest
scores are in regional and local administration, the economic sector and
healthcare. These are the more relatively apolitical sectors, but also sectors
which likely employ a large number of people. Particularly for regional and
local administration, this may provide parties with opportunities for reward-
ing rank-and-file party activists with employment as well as providing the
facilities necessary for coordinating clientelism. However, more critical
sectors like the foreign service, judiciary and the media receive relatively
lower scores. Although not as professional as India, Pakistani parties are
not seen as heavily intertwined with the state as Bangladesh. As proposed
by H3, if parties lack institutionalisation and are incapable of co-opting the
state, an institutionalised party system cannot be formed.
Conclusion
Three types of systems can be seen. In India’s party system the BJP and INC
largely exist independently of the state. The two parties are organisationally
Table 3. Averaged responses on extent to which appointments in the state sector are
made primarily as a means of rewarding party loyalty. Responses range from a scale of 0
(not at all) to 4 (to a great extent).
Bangladesh (n = 8) India (n = 15) Pakistan (n = 7)
Economic 3.38 1.94 3
Finance 3.5 1.69 2.43
Judicial 3.86 1.19 2.14
Media 3.25 1.8 2.29
Military and Police 3.63 1.25 2.43
Foreign Service 2.75 0.93 1.83
Culture and Education 3.38 2.63 2.43
Healthcare 2.38 1.33 2.57
Regional and Local Administration 3.75 2.75 3.43
Average 3.32 1.72 2.51
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complex and particularly for the BJP, their linkages are far less reliant on cli-
entelism and the access to state resources that the party can provide. In this
case, the party system can more clearly be seen as structured by institutiona-
lised parties with continuity arising from the strength of individual parties.
This conforms to H1 and the dominant assumption that the institutionalisa-
tion of parties underpins PSI. While institutionalised parties are not a necess-
ary condition for stable party systems, their presence is sufficient.
By contrast, in Bangladesh, we find a system in which parties are heavily
intertwined and dependent on the state. This is particularly the case for
the ruling BAL. In this party system, parties are highly personalised and the
party organisation is largely a means of distributing clientelism. In this case,
rather than developing the party organisation, the strength of parties
comes from their close relationship to the state. Stability in Bangladesh’s
party system is a consequence of the intertwining of parties and the state.
As stated in H2, if parties lack institutionalisation but are able to co-opt the
state to supplement their deficiencies this a sufficient condition for the for-
mation of an institutionalised party system.
Finally, without institutionalised parties or the successful co-optation of
the state and its resources, a party system will not be able to stabilise as
stated in H3. Pakistan’s party system shows a partial attempt at co-opting
the state with partially institutionalised parties. The two old established
parties, the PML (N) and PPP, are seen as highly clientelist yet in terms of
party patronage, we can see that the state retains relative independence.
This independence of the state explains why their clientelism is not as
effective as that seen in Bangladesh. Without strong party organisations
and insufficient control over state resources to supplement their deficiencies,
Pakistan’s parties suffer from relatively weak linkages. Considering Pakistan’s
history of military involvement in politics and its strong bureaucracy, it is
understandable how the parties have been unable to intertwine themselves
with the state as the military continues to wield significant economic and pol-
itical power. While the PML (N) and PPP have been able to establish them-
selves as important parties in the Pakistani party system through their use
of state resources, they have found themselves insufficiently intertwined.
This would explain why the Pakistani party system shows greater fluidity
and why it was possible for the PTI to disrupt the party system that previously
centred around the PML (N) and PPP.
There are thus three systems: an institutionalised party system born out of
parties’ intimate relationship with the state (Bangladesh), an institutionalised
party system made up of institutionalised parties (India), and a more fluid
party system where parties are only moderately institutionalised and have
been incapable of co-opting the state to prop up the parties (Pakistan).
Parties’ relationship with the state clearly have a significant effect on their
ability to remain electorally competitive and for an institutionalised party
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system to emerge. Bangladesh’s experience illustrates this well. On the
surface, Bangladesh’s parties appear to be institutionalised, however, a
closer investigation reveals that this is largely dependent on their relationship
with the state. In this case, rather than developing the party organisation,
both of Bangladesh’s main parties focused their efforts on co-opting the
state. Out of this, the parties were able to build linkages based on clientelism
which could sustain the parties’ electoral support and through party patron-
age could tie political elites to the party. In Pakistan by contrast, where parties
were insufficiently capable of co-opting the state due to the strength of state
institutions, the two historic parties, the PML (N) and PPP, have been unable
to fight off a challenger – the PTI.
If parties are capable of intertwining themselves with the state, their access
to state resources can be used to supplement the deficiencies that would
otherwise undermine their ability to remain electorally competitive. In such
a party system, stability arises out of the strength of parties’ relationship to
the state, rather than the extent to which individual parties are institutiona-
lised. If a party can capture the state, challengers can successfully be fought
off and continuity in the system will prevail. In this way, the institutionalisa-
tion of individual parties is not a necessary condition for party systems to
stabilise as conventionally accepted.
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